Introduction
Hydra |ˈhīdrə|-"In Greek mythology, a many-headed snake whose heads grew again as they were cut off, … in figurative usage, a thing which is hard to overcome [or resist because of its pervasive or enduring quality] or its many aspects". 1 The hydra is in many ways a well-working allegory for the numerous conflicts the EU has been facing in the GMO authorization process, and in particular regarding the complex deadlocks in the authorization of GMOs for cultivation. In the 1990s, heavy pressure at the international level 2 caused the responsible EU decision-makers to establish a regulatory framework 3 and the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) 4 to finally resolve their struggles with the de facto moratorium on GMO authorization. Unfortunately, this solution to the conflicts and struggles with GMO authorization did not prove to be sufficient. Even worse, the EU decision-makers faced what we call the first deadlock. It originated from the continuous bans of GMOs that Member States imposed with the safeguard clause, 5 now in particular on GMO cultivation. 6 As with the Hydra's many heads which are growing back numerously every time one head is cut off, each time one issue was solved in the GMO authorization process, numerous other problems came up.
The Former Authorization Procedure and the

Importance of Science
The first deadlock on GMO authorization has its origins in the complex interplay of scientific risk assessors and political risk managers. This section aims at providing a short overview of the authorization process to consequently analyse the first deadlock.
Two legislative acts govern the former regulatory framework on the GMO authorization 
Graph 1 Notification procedure for GMO authorization under Directive 18/2001/EC
35 Since Regulation 182/2011 is in effect, the comitology procedure has changed so that "only the comitology committee composed of representatives of national administrations will be able to approve or reject the draft acting with a qualified majority of its members", see in Weimer, What Price Flexbility?, supra note 34. Therefore, the comitology procedure was reduced to a two stage one. However, as the procedure before has led to the first deadlock, we describe the former one in this section. 
Authorisation
The placement of a GMO on the internal market must be preceded by the notification procedure laid down in Directive 2001/18/EC and presented in Graph 1. The GM-company needs to notify the national competent authority (the national risk assessor) of the Member State where it first wants to market the product. 40 The authority assesses the notification and indicates whether the product is scientifically safe for human health and the environment. 41 EFSA writes its opinion by drawing on national authorities' risk assessments. 42 After the Commission and the Member States have received EFSA's risk assessment, a standing committee decides on the GMO authorization. 43 If no Member
State objects the placing on the market, the initial risk assessor gives written consent to the GM-company merchandise the product. 44 In the case that all Member States do not mutually recognize the risk assessment, a qualified majority needs to be found in the Council. The decision maker of last resort is the Commission, usually accepting the authorizations. 45 A Member State can stil ban "the use and/or sale" 46 of an already authorized GMO by evoking the safeguard clause 47 of Directive 2001/18/EC. 48 Coherence of the authorization standards to resort to natural sciences is guaranteed, as this clause requires the submission of new and additional scientific information on potential adverse effects of that GMO on human health and the
environment. The Member State must inform the Commission and the other Member
States as well as the public. 49 A decision at EU level must first be taken in the committee again. If no agreement is reached, the draft decision is forwarded to the Council. 50 In the case that still no consent can be found here either, the Commission can directly request a Member State to revoke the ban, as described below. Generally, it is essential to note that the entire authorization procedure is based on the assessment of the outcome of natural sciences studies and the interpretation of this assessment by risk management. Risk regulation thus always resorts to natural sciences as an 'arbiter' between risk assessors, on the one hand, and risk managers, on the other hand.
TheAuthorizationProcedureinPractice-theFirstDeadlock
As shown above, the authorization procedure resorts to natural science to create reliable and accurate standards. In practice, however, the authorization procedure has developed into a heated debate both at the national and the EU level since national bans on cultivation and imports have been disputed for over a decade. third, the ambiguous role of science in risk management make it impossible for science to be the solution to the deadlock.
TheUnreliabilityofScientificfacts
Scientific facts "are nothing but answers to questions that could have been asked differently". 73 This quote by the sociologist Beck describes precisely one of the main problems for science in its imposed role of being a neutral arbiter in risk assessments. , each scientific study can be based on different methodologies and research designs. 75 In the context of GMO assessment this explains why some scientific studies conclude that cultivation is nonproblematic whereas others find potential hazards. We argue that the lacks of a common regulatory framework on EU level is not the only problem, there is arguably also a problem of objectivity: the bioethical scientist Rossi states bluntly that "objectivity in risk assessment would require objectivity at each of the subsidiary evaluative levels, and …, there are numerous reasons to doubt that such an objective standard can be elaborated at present".
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Regarding the important role of science in risk assessment, we claim that its problem of objectivity also holds true for the whole scientific assessment process of GMOs. 
Science'sroleinriskassessment
During the authorization process, the potential risks of a GMO are addressed in risk assessments, which are conducted at the national and EU level, by the national authorities and EFSA.
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The possibility to argue with numerous studies that differ in their judgements on the potential risk of GMOs for humans and the environment leads to yet another factor, explaining why natural sciences cannot be the solution to the deadlock. In risk regulation in general, and also in the GMO authorization process, the uncertainty paradox as established by Van Asselt and Vos is persistent. 81 Scientific uncertainty manifests itself when science cannot deliver finite answers. Scientific uncertainty is defined in this article as a situation where "scientific or historic proofs of harmful consequences are lacking, but
suspicions cannot be fully refuted either". 82 The uncertainty paradox is produced by risk assessor, EFSA and risk managers, such as the Commission, when they demand concrete scientific evidence 83 , whereas this is arguably not possible in a situation of scientific uncertainty.
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Scientific uncertainty has the potential to lead to "irresponsible attenuation of the risk, sustained controversy, deadlocks, legitimacy problems, unintelligible decision-79 Commission Communication on the precautionary principle, COM (2000)1.
80 "it was accepted that scientific expertise should be pluralized in risk assessment in order to render more explicit which value judgments about the acceptability of harm are et play, and to take into account the permanent interplay between risk assessment and risk management. 
Science'sroleinRiskManagement
Although risk assessment is formally separated from risk management, the scientific risk assessment implicitly guides the risk manager in its decision.
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In line with our argumentation and according to Jasanoff, a Together, the examples of Austria and Germany give a broader picture of possible grounds on which opposition to GMOs can be founded -grounds inaccessible for the natural sciences, which are central to EFSA's risk assessment, as il ustrated above.
Underlying reasons, which were not assessed drove Member States to reject GMOs on their territory. Regarding the two cases of Austria and Germany, the 'arbiter' role of science is made yet again impossible by a risk assessment approach, which does not take into account scientific uncertainty and excludes 'non-scientific' grounds, such as socioeconomic, cultural and ethical reasons. These grounds are also 'non-risk' issues, since they do not deal with potential threats to human health or the environment. As this section shows, the applications of the safeguard clause were not, or were not primarily about risk, thus, GMOs do not touch primarily on scientific questions. Thus, it is wrong "to cal public issues about new technologies which involve risk but which also involve many other issues, 'risk issues'." 102 In the current regulatory framework, these reasons are legally insufficient to justify a ban, although they play an important role in the political decisionmaking on GMOs.
Therefore, the proposed Amendment to Directive 2001/18/EC is examined to illustrate the Commission's attempt to resolve the above-described deadlock on GMO authorization.
As we have shown with the examples of Austria and Germany, Member States had nonscientific concerns about GMOs, which the new proposal aims to address through the introduction of non-scientific grounds that may be invoked by Member States to justify bans on cultivation of GMOs. After a brief introduction of the proposed amendment, the issues that arose concerning the amendment are discussed.
TheProposal:ASolutiontotheDeadlock?
In order to resolve the first deadlock several Member States, regardless of pro-or anti-GMO stances, urged the Commission to propose a reform of the GMO regulatory framework. In order to better understand whether the proposal could provide a solution for the untangling of the second deadlock, the legal issues that have appeared problematic with regard to the Commission's proposal are important to examine. These legal problems formed one of the main concerns of the Member States in the Council, and were thus leading to the deadlock as one of the heated subjects of discussion. Thus, this chapter aims to answer how far this proposal is legally viable. The compatibility of the proposal with EU internal market rules, and specifically the list of grounds invocable by Member
States is first discussed. Furthermore, possible conflicts with WTO regulations concerning the proposal are also examined.
EUInternalMarketCompatibility
In order to determine the proposal's compatibility with EU law, the effect of the restriction or prohibition of the cultivation of GMOs on the internal market needs to be taken into consideration. The issue of such compatibility was first raised by the ad hoc working party established by COREPER to consider the Commission's original version of the proposal. in accordance with the general common market exemptions criteria of being justified, proportionate and non-discriminatory.
According to the proposed Article 26b, the national measures must be based on grounds other than environmental and health risk assessments, thus formulating a negative definition of admissibility. 115 The phrasing of the proposal suggests that the socio-economic aspect of GMO cultivation is referred to, which -due to its broad meaning lacking specific examples -has been criticized as lacking clarity. This varied list of grounds thus created through the negative formulation of the Commission appears to indicate that by creating wide-ranging possibilities for Member States to deviate from the general EU authorization of cultivation, the proposal attempts to reduce the scope of harmonization of the legal framework on GMO cultivation. 116 Due to the ambiguity of the negative formulation of grounds found in the original proposal, the Commission Services released a non-exhaustive list of possible grounds that could be invoked to limit the cultivation of GMOs. 117 The seven grounds listed by the Commission Services were the following: "public morals, public order, avoiding GMO presence in other products, social policy objectives, town and country planning or land use, cultural policy and general environmental policy objectives, other than assessment of the adverse effects of GMOs on the environment." 118 As six grounds out of the seven indicated in the list of the Commission are socio-economic in their nature, the division between scientific assessment, that is environmental and health concerns, and socio-economic evaluation is demonstrated.
Consequently, as emphasis is placed on socio-economic grounds, it is helpful to examine the Member States assessment of the socio-economic impact of GMOs. The
Commission report on the socio-economic implications of GMO cultivation 119 found -on the basis of Member States' contributions -that the perception of the definition of socioeconomic dimension of GMO cultivation deviates greatly between the Member States and Concerning the socio-economic grounds, the four specifically mentioned by the Danish proposal are related to the difficulties of implementing coexistence measures due to geographic conditions, avoidance of GMO presence in other products, the need to protect agricultural production diversity, or the need to ensure seed and plant propagating material purity. All of these are rather concerned with more specific issues -when compared to the ones in the Commission's indicative list of grounds -, which could be evidenced by statistical and scientific data. However, the grounds of the Danish proposal also only appear to be an indicative list, as there is no suggestion of it being exhaustive.
The Danish proposal is most likely not going to be the last version of the proposal, as it failed to reach qualified majority in the Council. 
CompatibilitywithWTORegulation
Since the European Union is a player of the global trade community, it must abide by international trade rules. Therefore, the compatibility of the proposal with WTO rules is the second main legal issue that has been frequently questioned by the Council Legal order to ensure that legal certainty is provided the current proposal would need to be altered. The following section discusses our suggestions in order to achieve such greater clarity of the law.
Unlocking the Deadlocks?
While 
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In particular: '(1) the need to fulfil the expectations of Polish society; (2) richness of biodiversity and the need to prevent serious disturbances to the functioning of the environment; (3) the fragmented structure of Polish agriculture; (4) specific agricultural production profile with domination of conventional traditional and organic farming; (5) following from the two previous characteristics -the impossibility of elimination of a risk of cross-contamination and preventing of potential damage that could be caused as a result of crossover of transgenes into conventional crops; (6) the need to limit the cultivation of GM plants to areas that do not contain elements of value for nature conservation, and whose agrarian structure enables the safe cultivation of transgenic plants without Furthermore, two possible examples for the assessment procedure to be performed by the committee are discussed.
InclusionofIndicativeListofGroundsinArt.26b
In order to ensure legal certainty and provide some guidance to Member States for invoking a ban on societal grounds in this article we argue that an indicative list of grounds should be included in the proposed Art. 26b of Directive 2001/18/EC itself.
The indicative list proposed by the Commission is as follows:
• 'Public morals (including religious, philosophical and ethical concerns);
• Public order;
• Avoiding GMO presence in other products, i.e. contributing to:
-Preservation of organic and conventional farming systems;
-Avoiding the presence of GMOs in other products such as particular food products under GM-free schemes;
• Social policy objectives, e.g.:
-Keeping certain type of rural development in given areas to maintain current levels of occupation (such as specific policy for mountain regions);
-Town and country planning/land use;
• Cultural policy, e.g.:
-preservation of societal traditions in terms of traditional farming methods;
-preservation of cultural heritage linked to territorial production processes with particular characteristics;
• General environmental policy objectives, other than assessment of the adverse effects of GMOs on environment; e.g.: Apart from the fact, that the list is non-exhaustive in nature, and can potentially be extended in the future, there are stil two fundamental questions to be answered. Those questions relate to the 'Who' and 'How' of the assessment, i.e. who should be in charge of this assessment, and how the grounds mentioned in the list can be operationalized in order to be compatible for assessment?
TheAssessmentCommittee
In our opinion, the task should be delegated to a committee, established under the framework of EFSA. We argue that at the European level, EFSA's role could be redefined by the inclusion of societal concerns. This Committee could provide quality judgment concerning the sufficiency of Member States' societal assessments for legal purposes. For the sake of substantiating the societal grounds, the enhancement of a better understanding of the Member States assessment of the socio-economic impact of GMO cultivation could also be a task of the committee. The creation of such a committee is arguably necessary as without it the functioning of the proposal could be prejudiced. Currently, there is no such entity that could provide sufficient guidelines concerning the invocation of societal grounds. Such an EFSA committee could provide guidelines concerning the acceptability of societal grounds as right now there is no such committee providing those guidelines.
The Member States competent authority would forward their societal assessment on GMOs to that committee. Consequently, EFSA's committee would write a report on the basis of the individual Member States' societal reports and hand them to the Commission.
The Commission would then regard the individual Member States' concerns. GMOs,ScienceandtheReformoftheLegalFramework
PossibleAssessmentPractices
After having clarified the issue of the entity responsible for the task of the assessment of invocable grounds, the next question to elaborate on, concerns the operationalization of the grounds in order to accomplish the assessment. Two examples are provided that could enhance the process of assessment, which are firstly based on a report of the European Commission and the Parliament, and secondly on the reporting practice of the Dutch
Commissie Genetische Modificatie (COGEM).
A joined report from the European Commission and the Parliament from December 2009 indicates that "the understanding of the meaning and scope of the socioeconomic dimension of GMO cultivation varies widely among Member States and the stakeholders". 142 Furthermore, the socio-economic implications "are often not analyzed in an objective manner". 143 Therefore, it is necessary to establish systematic analytical guidelines, which clearly instruct on how to conduct the assessment and, even more important, which aspects shall be part of this assessment.
In recent decades, the importance of ´social impact assessment´ (SIA) has increased.
`Social impacts` thereby refer to the consequences which affect the population due to a public or private action. This can relate to lifestyles, work, social relations, but also norms, values and belief systems. 144 The SIA then can be defined as the attempt of an a priori examination of an event or policy action. Thus, attempting to give a prognosis on social implications.
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The EU Impact Assessment Guidelines list thirty-five dimensions, which are related to Economics, Social Affairs and Environmental and Health Concerns. As the amendment proposal excludes grounds on environment and health, these dimensions cannot be part of a SIA. We identified ten dimensions in total (Table 1) , which could be related to the cultivation of GMOs and grounds for a GMO ban. One of the most important aspects is the compatibility of unilateral GMO bans on the Internal Market. As stated in the previous section, it is important that Member States, GMOs,ScienceandtheReformoftheLegalFramework wishing to ban a GMO from cultivation on their territory, is in line with Article 26 TFEU, thus, the functioning of the Internal Market must not be distorted.
More difficult to assess is the possible negative effect on EU competitiveness as a whole, if a Member State or a group of Member States is willing to ban a GMO from cultivation. As the case of Monsanto, which plans to leave the European market, 146 indicates, there can be adverse effects on the European Union`s competitive position. It is not unlikely that more GM companies will follow Monsanto, leaving the EU as the only continent without GM cultivation. Investments into research and plants then also might be restrained. This dimension is closely linked with Macroeconomics and Employment.
The employment dimension relates to the creation or loss of jobs due to a certain policy measure. Applied to the case of GMOs, an SIA has to measure in how far jobs and employment opportunities are created or destroyed by GMO cultivation in a certain region or country. It might be the case that GMOs destroy traditional economic structures, or make it even impossible to grow non-GMO seeds, since it is practically impossible to prevent GM pollen to spread to non-GM plants. This is particularly troublesome with regard to organic farming, as the case of Austria demonstrates.
The regional dimension also takes into account that different European regions would be affected differently by GMO cultivation, due to geographical, agricultural and social factors. This aspect is decisive in the local populations' acceptance of GMO cultivation.
The SIA should also take into account specific regional economic sectors, which can be affected. A further aspect is the cross-border effect of GMO cultivation in frontier areas, when a pro-GM country shares a border with a GM-free Member State.
In terms of innovation and research, it has to be assessed, whether a ban of GMOs might have adverse effects on terms of research in the EU and certain Member States.
Many GM companies are research-intensive units. Again, the question has to be answered, whether bans might lead to an exodus of exactly those kinds of companies, which play an important role in the so-called future markets, such as bio-technology. Innovation is an important economic growth factor. This also relates to other objective the EU aims to pursue, such as the science and research strategy. 147 In this respect, it is evenly important to take the broader macro-economic picture into account. Unilateral bans might worsen the conditions for investments and distort the functioning of markets, but also the act of national concern, if based on justifiable grounds, and no longer be a concern for the entire internal market. This would be a step to de-harmonize a policy area, GMO cultivation in this respect. Although, such a reform would be a novelty in the history of European integration, such a regulatory framework would acknowledge national diversity across the EU. However, it is important to operationalize the indicative grounds towards clear assessment variables, on which basis it is possible to evaluate the Member States´ bans in a more systematic manner.
The assessment should be performed by a committee, which is incorporated under EFSA`s roof, but which is separated from the scientific assessment. Furthermore, we propose to introduce the changes for an experimental period of ten years, in which the new regime can be evaluated.
Thus, we argue that the proposed changes discussed above do have the potential to provide a solution to the one aspect of the deadlock. Specifically, through the inclusion of grounds in Art.26b and the creation of an assessment agency, Member States could receive sufficient guidance for the invocation of non-scientific grounds. Therefore, the deadlock concerning the frequent reliance of Member States on the safeguard clause with claims of new scientific evidence could be if not altogether avoided, but at least limited.
Accommodating Diversity -The Broader Picture
Put in broader perspective, the proposed amendment described and justified in the last section does not present a certain and final solution to both. The Hydra-like nature of GMO authorization makes reforming very difficult and complex as various stakeholders mean various opinions to incorporate; furthermore, the inherent problems with science as an arbiter remain, similar to the immortal head of the Hydra. Nevertheless, the direct inclusion of societal concerns into the debate on GMO cultivation bans and the use of social sciences to measure and assess these concerns is an important step forward towards a risk regulation process that is closer to reality.
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The increased demand for enclosing deliberation and differentiation. While it is attempted to consider scientific and nonscientific concerns of all stakeholders in the decision-making process through deliberation, differentiation steps in after the authorization of a certain GMO has taken place and allows Member States to abstain from the authorization. 154 With the amendment proposal of the Commission, the latter seems to favour reforms in the direction of differentiation since Member States would be able to ban GMOs post-authorization. As our proposal is based on this approach, we deviate from Hristova's analysis. In contrast to her view, the de-GMOs,ScienceandtheReformoftheLegalFramework harmonisation and distribution of power back to the national level that might follow the proposal is not perceived as a negative consequence for the EU and the internal market.
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Risk regulation and possible cultivation bans are a trade issue also prevalent in the WTO context. In line with the argumentation of the legal scholar Weimer, current legal frameworks at WTO level forbid unnecessary trade restrictions, but also are already "recognised for being more generous in recognising the importance of certain values when weighed against the negative effects on trade". 156 Additionally, inside the US internal market there already is the model example of the situation in which possible bans at state level are allowed, but that social concern at the higher level does not allow for a national ban. Although this is the case for the chemical Bisphenol A, the issue at stake still is risk regulation in the situation of uncertainty. 157 In reference to the widespread concern in some Member States that cultivation bans might be a hindrance to the internal market, it might be more feasible to generally argue for a cal for 'free movement of most goods'
in some sectors instead of the so far predominant notion of free movement of goods.
This sector-by-sector approach would furthermore contrast a too strict and inflexible risk regulation, which in turn probably leads to a growing discontent in society. 158 All this also relates back to the aim of the differentiation method by Hristova to accommodate diversity and different concerns of stakeholders.
The coexistence of natural and social sciences in this article's proposal also aims to shed more light into the bias of science in general. Similar to what was argued above,
Weimer stresses that the nature of science is socially constructed and influences the evaluations excessively. 159 Social science studies are also biased due to the importance of definitions of social impact and acceptable thresholds. 160 On another note, risk regulation faces the struggle of political influences. This is called de-politicisation, a politicisation of the scientific executive function, which might (…) lead to obscure and insensitive decision making at the level of the simple application of science to complex social relations, and one which might (…) deny its own normative under-pinnings". 161 We think that the combination of both kinds of sciences is needed so that a) these biases become clearly acknowledged and communicated inside and outside of EFSA, also leading to more uncertainty tolerance and b) a justifiable and objective risk assessment is ensured.
Without science, undesirable arbitrary risk regulation would be more probable as politics might be even more influential than it is now. 162 Natural and social sciences thus are essential for improving the risk regulation process in the direction of more embeddedness and against an infeasible one-size-fits-all approach; 163 in the attempt to come closer to a solution to the deadlock, it is therefore suggested that the diverse concerns are accommodated by differentiation and the inclusion of social sciences next to natural sciences.
Conclusion
In this article, we aim to analyse to what extent the two deadlocks in the authorization of GMO cultivation can be unlocked. The GMO authorization process is an allegoric Hydra as complex and various issues lead to continuous debates and blocking minorities in the decision-making procedure. Several current events present the GMO authorization as a hot topic: first, Monsanto declared to left the EU internal market due to the persistent banning of MON810 in some Member States; second, global protests against the same company have spread awareness of the topic and have shown the widespread concern of the public, and third, the Commission has announced to revive talks on a draft amendment of Directive 2001/18/EC. This latter draft legislation aimed at solving the first deadlock, being the continuous and adamant invocation of the safeguard clause by Member States such as Austria, on the one hand, and the persistence on the illegality of those bans by EFSA and the Commission, on the other hand. The fact that not only Austria, but several others also banned MON810 for the bans are given. Based on both analyses, we propose a) an exhaustive list of grounds in order to safeguard legal certainty, b) the inclusion of a social impact assessment to guarantee non-arbitrary bans on non-risk grounds, and c) the establishment of an assessment committee as part of EFSA. The particular task of this committee is to ensure the evaluation of the assessments based on social sciences. As we are aware of the struggle to reform this complex policy domain, we argue for a sunset clause in the amendment to allow for continuous improvement of the regulatory procedure.
It also needs to be recognized that this proposal is a first step forward to accommodating diversity by the method of differentiation. Acknowledging the limits of science and expanding its scope at the same time, we hope that if results and issues of both natural and social sciences are discussed, the problems of scientific bias and uncertainty can be taken into account. It is interesting to see how the situation of the two deadlocks develops in the future. More research should be conducted to investigate on how social sciences can be included in the future authorization process of GMOs in the context of EU risk regulation and the already established agencies. Moreover, it is worth observing the contemporary tensions surrounding the GMO debate such as Monsanto leaving the European market, two-thirds of the European public opposing GMOs and whether new problems arise.
